Indiana Intellectual Property Law News

Indianapolis, Indiana - Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Sebastian Wiradharma a/k/a Sebastian Singh ("Singh") and Singpet Pte. Ltd., both of Singapore, infringed the trademark COMFORTIS, Registration Number 3,370,168, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Lilly, through its Elanco Animal Health Division, manufactures, markets and sells pet medicines, including flea-control preparations and treatments for parasitic infestations. It contends that it has made long and continuous of the name and mark "Elanco" in connection with veterinary preparations. It also asserts that it has long used the "Comfortis" mark, which was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office in 2008. Lilly claims that it has sold tens of millions of dollars' worth of veterinary preparations, pet medicines and related goods and services under the Elanco and Comfortis marks.

Among Lilly's products is Trifexis, a once-monthly veterinary medication, which contains the veterinary chemicals spinosad and milbemycin oxime. Trifexis is for the prevention of heartworms, fleas and intestinal worms. It is sold in the United States with what Lilly contends to be an inherently distinctive and non-functional trade dress. Trifexis is available only by prescription through licensed veterinarians. Lilly sells a similar product in Australia, with similar trade dress, under the name "Panoramis."

Defendant Singh, who is allegedly the principal of Singpet, and Singpet do business over the Internet, including via websites at www.singpet.com, www.petcorporate.com, www.fleastuff.com and http://www.ourpetworld.net/home.asp, among others.

Defendants are accused of marketing and selling European and Australian versions of Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines to customers in the United States. Specifically, Lilly contends that Defendants market "Panoramis (Triflexis)" [sic] on their websites. While the Defendants are apparently based in Singapore, this marketing is allegedly directed at consumers in the United States. Lilly asserts that units designed for sale in markets such as Europe and Australia are neither intended nor authorized for sale in the United States.

Lilly further objects to the Defendants' purported advertisement of units designed for the Australian and European markets as identical to or interchangeable with the units designed for sale in the United States. It states that that the Elanco-branded "Panoramis" pet medicines are materially different from its Elanco-branded "Trifexis" pet medicines sold in the United States.

Lilly contends that the Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines are tailored to meet the requirements of different geographic regions and countries to reflect the differences in language, climate, government regulations, units of measure, local addresses and telephone numbers, among other things.

Trademark attorneys for Lilly assert that Defendants are not authorized to use Lilly's Elanco or Comfortis names and trade dress in connection with the sale of once-monthly spinosad and milbemycin oxime pet medicines outside of Australia. Lilly has sued Defendants, asserting willful infringement of its trademarks. It asserts the following in its complaint:

• First Claim for Relief: Trademark Infringement in Violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act
• Second Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Third Claim for Relief: False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Fourth Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Indiana Common Law

Lilly asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; damages, including treble damages; the Defendants to be required to notify all purchasers of the accused products, request the return of the products and refund the price paid; pre- and post-judgment interest and costs of the suit.

Practice Tip:

Lilly is objecting to the so-called "grey market" for its veterinary pharmaceuticals. Prices for drugs can vary considerably between countries, often as a result of government intervention in the market. As a result, a "grey market" - selling a drug intended for use in one country to consumers in another country - can emerge. In this complaint, Lilly has framed its objection to a grey market for its pet-care pharmaceuticals as an intellectual property dispute.

Intellectual property law requires a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, innovation will be discouraged if inventors, authors and other creators of intellectual property are not allowed to benefit from their labors. Such a problem arises if others are allowed to use creators' ideas without compensating them (the "free-rider problem"). On the other hand, the public good is promoted by encouraging free competition in the marketplace and easy alienability of property.

Under the first-sale defense to infringement, once a copy of an item protected by intellectual property laws has been sold to a purchaser, the creator of the intellectual property generally may not prevent that purchaser from reselling or otherwise disposing of the item. In patent and copyright law, the first-sale rule in most cases provides an absolute defense against infringement. In patent law, this is also referred to as "patent exhaustion." As a result, the purchaser of a copy of the work and the owner of the intellectual property rights to that work may become competitors in the marketplace if the purchaser goes to resell a copy of the work.

The first-sale defense is not as broad in a trademark context. Enunciated in 1924 by the U.S. Supreme Court, the general rule for the resale of a trademark item provides that, after a trademark owner has sold a trademarked product, the buyer ordinarily may resell that product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). However, unlike patent or copyright law, trademark law has as one of its primary goals preventing confusion among potential purchasers. Typically, but not always, such confusion will not exist where a genuine article bearing an authentic trademark is sold. While there is a split among the circuits concerning the extent to which consumer confusion is a relevant factor, some hold that certain types of confusion about a product's origin cause the first-sale defense to be inapplicable to the resale of a trademarked good. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2010).

Continue reading "Eli Lilly Sues Singpet for Trademark Infringement" »

Washington, D.C. - Utah Senator introduces a bill which includes both fee shifting and bonding to stop the drain on the economy caused by patent trolls.

U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), current member and former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, recently introduced legislation to address the growing threat of so-called "patent trolls." Patent trolls purchase existing broad patents and then accuse businesses of infringing on those patents, in search of a financial settlement or litigation. Hatch's legislation, the Patent Litigation Integrity Act (S. 1612), gives judges more opportunity to shift the costs and expenses of litigation, and gives defendants the opportunity to request a bond up front to prove the party seeking to assert a claim on the patent has adequate resources to turn over to the prevailing party if that party is successful in defending its claim.

"Patent trolls are a drain on the innovation in our country and their practices need to end," Hatch said. "Many small businesses in Utah and throughout the country simply don't have the resources to fight back against the predators in our patent system, and my bill gives them adequate resources to fight back. Fee shifting without the option to seek a bond is like writing a check on an empty account, and that's why it's important to include both in any legislation dealing with patent trolls. It's my hope the Senate will act soon to put a stop to the patent trolls draining the innovation in our country and weakening our economy."

Patent Litigation Integrity Act One-page Summary October 29 2013

Hammond, Indiana - Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Miguel Serrato and Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC, both d/b/a Miguel's Mexican Fusion Grill, all of Schererville, Indiana unlawfully intercepted and televised the Ultimate Fighting Championship 139: Mauricio "Shogun" Rua v. Dan Henderson, Championship Fight Program.

Joe Hand Promotions, a commercial distributor of sporting events, was granted exclusive rights to distribute via closed-circuit television the Ultimate Fighting Championship ("UFC") Mauricio "Shogun" Rua v. Dan Henderson fight (the "Program"), which Joe Hand Promotions asserts was telecast nationwide on November 19, 2101 [sic].

In the complaint against Serrato and Miguel's Mexican Fusion Grill, an intellectual property lawyer for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and "tortuous" [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entity which apparently owns Miguel's Mexican Fusion Grill, Joe Hand Promotions has also sued Serrato as an individual, claiming that he had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Miguel's Mexican Fusion Grill. Joe Hand Promotions asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its UFC Program.

Serrato and Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Promotions seeks statutory damages of $100,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $50,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory and punitive damages on the claim of conversion; costs, including costs incurred for the service of process and the investigation of potential wrongdoing; and attorney's fees. These claims have been made both against Miguel Mexican Fusion Grill, LLC and as personal liability claims against Serrato.

Practice Tip #1: Joe Hand Promotions has sued two entities: a limited liability company and an individual who is apparently a principal in that company. While limited liability companies are intended, as the name suggests, to limit the liability of the principals, they are not always successful in doing so. Where a principal is personally involved in certain types of illegal activity, legal mechanisms (such as a limited liability company) that are designed to shield the principal from liability may fail to do so.

Practice Tip #2: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #3: In addition to misspelled words, incorrectly numbered paragraphs and an assertion that every page is numbered "Page PAGE 7" [sic], this complaint asserts wrongdoing which occurred on "November 19, 2101." It is then dated as having been signed on "November 8, 20134." Such inexactitude is perhaps due in part to Joe Hand Promotions having filed hundreds upon hundreds of similar lawsuits. Nonetheless, at least in this case, such flaws in pleading might present a creative attorney with the opportunity to make at least one novel argument: given that, in this filing it is admitted that more than 18,000 years have passed between the date of the alleged illegal act and the time when the lawsuit was/will be initiated (although all 18,000+ years have yet to occur), the statute of limitations surely has, or will have, run at the time of the filing of the complaint.

Continue reading "Joe Hand Promotions Again in Court Asserting Unlawful Interception " »

Indianapolis, Indiana - Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana ("Lilly") has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Graham Nelson, Zoja Pty Ltd. d/b/a Pet Supply International Ltd., and Pet Products Net, all of Australia, infringed the trademark COMFORTIS, Trademark Registration No. 3,370,168, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

Lilly, through its Elanco Animal Health Division, manufactures, markets and sells pet medicines, including flea-control preparations and treatments for parasitic infestations. It contends that it has made long and continuous of the name and mark "Elanco" in connection with veterinary preparations. It also asserts that it has long used the "Comfortis" mark, which was registered by the U.S. Trademark Office in 2008. Lilly claims that it has sold tens of millions of dollars' worth of veterinary preparations, pet medicines and related goods and services under the Elanco and Comfortis marks.

Among Lilly's products is Trifexis, a once-monthly veterinary medication, which contains the veterinary chemicals spinosad and milbemycin oxime. Trifexis is for the prevention of heartworms, fleas and intestinal worms. It is sold in the United States with what Lilly contends to be an inherently distinctive and non-functional trade dress. Trifexis is available only by prescription through licensed veterinarians. Lilly sells a similar product in Australia, with similar trade dress, under the name "Panoramis."

Defendants Nelson, Zoja, Pet Supply and Pet Products Net do business over the Internet, including at the website www.bestvaluepetsupplies.com. Among the products listed on their website is "Panoramis aka Trifexis." While the companies are apparently based in Australia, the website indicates that they ship to the United States.

Lilly has sued Defendants over the sale of Panoramis to the United States. It asserts that units designed for sale in markets such as Europe and Australia are neither intended nor authorized for sale in the United States. Lilly further indicates that the Elanco- and Comfortis-branded pet medicines are tailored to meet the requirements of different geographic regions and countries to reflect the differences in language, climate, government regulations, units of measure, local addresses and telephone numbers, among other things.

Lilly objects to the Defendants' purported advertisement of units designed for the Australian and European markets as identical to or interchangeable with the units designed for sale in the United States. It states that that the Elanco-branded "Panoramis" pet medicines are materially different from its Elanco-branded "Trifexis" pet medicines sold in the United States.

Trademark attorneys for Lilly assert that Defendants are not authorized to use Lilly's Elanco or Comfortis names and trade dress in connection with the sale of once-monthly spinosad and milbemycin oxime pet medicines outside of Australia. Lilly has sued Defendants, asserting willful infringement of its trademarks. It asserts the following in its complaint:

• First Claim for Relief: Trademark Infringement in Violation of Section 32 of the Lanham Act
• Second Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Third Claim for Relief: False Advertising in Violation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
• Fourth Claim for Relief: Unfair Competition in Violation of Indiana Common Law

Lilly asks for preliminary and permanent injunctions; damages, including treble damages; the Defendants to be required to notify all purchasers of the accused products, request the return of the products and refund the price paid; pre- and post-judgment interest and costs of the suit.

Practice Tip:

Lilly is objecting to the so-called "grey market" for its veterinary pharmaceuticals. Prices for drugs can vary considerably between countries, often as a result of government intervention in the market. As a result, a "grey market" - selling a drug intended for use in one country to consumers in another country - can emerge. In this complaint, Lilly has framed its objection to a grey market for its pet-care pharmaceuticals as an intellectual property dispute.

Intellectual property law requires a balancing of competing interests. On the one hand, innovation will be discouraged if inventors, authors and other creators of intellectual property are not allowed to benefit from their labors. Such a problem arises if others are allowed to use creators' ideas without compensating them (the "free-rider problem"). On the other hand, the public good is promoted by encouraging free competition in the marketplace and easy alienability of property.

Under the first-sale defense to infringement, once a copy of an item protected by intellectual property laws has been sold to a purchaser, the creator of the intellectual property generally may not prevent that purchaser from reselling or otherwise disposing of the item. In patent and copyright law, the first-sale rule in most cases provides an absolute defense against infringement. In patent law, this is also referred to as "patent exhaustion." As a result, the purchaser of a copy of the work and the owner of the intellectual property rights to that work may become competitors in the marketplace if the purchaser goes to resell a copy of the work.

The first-sale defense is not as broad in a trademark context. Enunciated in 1924 by the U.S. Supreme Court, the general rule for the resale of a trademark item provides that, after a trademark owner has sold a trademarked product, the buyer ordinarily may resell that product under the original mark without incurring any trademark liability. See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924). However, unlike patent or copyright law, trademark law has as one of its primary goals preventing confusion among potential purchasers. Typically, but not always, such confusion will not exist where a genuine article bearing an authentic trademark is sold. While there is a split among the circuits concerning the extent to which consumer confusion is a relevant factor, some hold that certain types of confusion about a product's origin cause the first-sale defense to be inapplicable to the resale of a trademarked good. See Au-Tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1134 (9th Cir. 2010).

Continue reading "Eli Lilly Sues Pet Supply, Pet Products Net and Graham Nelson for Trademark Infringement" »

Indianapolis, Indiana - Indiana Court of Appeals Judges Elaine Brown, Edward Najam and Paul Mathias reversed a trial court's entry of preliminary injunction, holding that the non-compete agreement at issue was overly broad and, thus, unreasonable as a matter of law.

Glacier Group ("Glacier") provides employee recruiting and placement services in the field of information technology. It primarily places salespeople, pre-sales engineers, systems engineers and people in leadership positions such as directors, vice presidents, chief financial officers and chief executive officers. Daniel Buffkin began working as a sales recruiter for Glacier in August 2008. Buffkin's work with Glacier was subject to an "Independent Contractor Agreement" (the "Agreement").

In June 2011, Glacier terminated the Agreement with Buffkin. In November 2012, it sued Buffkin alleging that he was in breach of the non-competition portion of the Agreement and requesting damages and injunctive relief.

In March 2013, the trial court determined that "during the almost three (3) year business relationship between [Glacier] and [Buffkin], [Buffkin] came into contact with a vast number of prospects and candidates, as well as clients of [Glacier], including their names and at the very least, their e-mail addresses, together with the requirements of [Glacier's] customers for prospects and candidates to fill employment positions" and that "[t]his therefore created a legitimate protectable business interest by [Glacier]."

The trial court also stated that "[Buffkin] has admitted to directly competing against [Glacier] after being terminated from working for [Glacier]" and that Buffkin had been either unable or unwilling to supply a list of "where and when [Buffkin] has obtained the contacts he has made that he has used to make placements in the field in which [Glacier] works and operates."

The trial court concluded that Glacier had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its case and granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting Buffkin from competing with Glacier in employee placement in the areas of "data storage, cloud, virtualization, big data, managed hosting, managed services, data communication, and telecommunication."

From this ruling, Buffkin brought an interlocutory appeal to the Indiana Court of Appeals. He argued that the non-compete clause of the Agreement was unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. He first asserted that the non-compete clause was overly broad because it did not have any restrictions regarding which industry it covered. He contended that, as written, the Agreement purported to prohibit him from doing executive recruiting in any industry. He also argued that the Agreement did not protect a legitimate interest of Glacier and that the restrictions on geographic scope were overly broad. Buffkin asked the Court of Appeals to hold that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction.

Glacier countered that it had provided Buffkin with insider knowledge and that Buffkin could not have had the success that he had after leaving Glacier without having used the proprietary information which he had acquired during his time with Glacier. It maintained that it had a protectable interest as a result of Buffkin's purported use of insider knowledge acquired at Glacier and that Buffkin's use of that information to Glacier's detriment should be enjoined.

The appellate court first considered whether Glacier had an interest to be protected. It held that, while Buffkin may have acquired training, knowledge and skills while working at Glacier, such general skills would not be sufficient to rise to the level of a protectable interest unless their use would result in irreparable injury to Glacier. No such irreparable injury was proven. Glacier also failed to prove that, during his time with the company, Buffkin had access to proprietary information which gave him an improper advantage at Glacier's expense. The court concluded that the interest to be protected by the non-competition provision of the Agreement, if any, was minimal.

The reasonableness of the restrictions was then addressed. Two provisions in particular were at issue: the geographic restriction and the activities restricted. The Agreement had attempted to restrict Buffkin from performing recruiting or placement services for employers "with offices in the continental United States." The court held that Glacier had not met its burden of proof to demonstrate that it had a legitimate interest to be protected by such a broad restriction and held the geographic restriction to be unreasonable.

The court next held that the broadly worded text restricting Buffkin from being "connected in any way with any business that competes" with Glacier, and which made no distinction between past, current, or potential future customers of Glacier was excessive and, thus, unenforceable. It held that the trial court's ruling had been clearly erroneous and that it had abused its discretion by granting the preliminary injunction.

Practice Tip #1: The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, to be enforceable, a non-compete agreement must be reasonable and that "[u]nlike reasonableness in many other contexts, the reasonableness of a noncompetition agreement is a question of law." Such agreements in employment contracts are strongly disfavored under Indiana law as restraints of trade. They are scrutinized more closely than most other types of contracts and are strictly construed against the employer. Identifying a party to the contract as an independent contractor rather than as an employee does not change the analysis.

Practice Tip #2: A preliminary injunction should not be granted except in rare instances in which the law and facts are clearly within the moving party's favor. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence the following: (1) a reasonable likelihood of success at trial; (2) the remedies at law are inadequate; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm to the nonmoving party from the granting of an injunction; and (4) the public interest would not be disserved by granting the requested injunction. If the party seeking the preliminary injunction fails to prove any of these requirements, the trial court's grant of an injunction will be considered an abuse of discretion.

Continue reading "Preliminary Injunction Improper for Overly Broad Non-Compete Agreement " »

Indianapolis, Indiana - Ambre Blends, LLC of Fishers, Indiana has filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that doTERRA, Inc., doTERRA International, LLC, both of Orem, Utah (collectively, "doTERRA") and Kerry Dodds d/b/a Kerry Essentials of Indianapolis, Indiana ("Kerry") infringed SOLACE®, Trademark No. 4266473, which has been registered by the U.S. Trademark Office.

In its complaint, Ambre Blends claims to have been producing organic body products since 2001. It offers four fragrances which are designed to be worn by both women and men. Founded in 2008, doTERRA offers essential oils both as single oils and as proprietary essential oil blends via independent product consultants. Both companies claim rights in the mark "Solace" in connection with essential oil products.

Ambre Blends asserts that it has used the Solace mark continuously in commerce since at least as early as February 2007. It holds a federally registered trademark on the mark in connection with "Aromatic preparations, namely, oils, body creams, body sprays, soaps, shower gel; Beauty creams; Body and beauty care cosmetics; Body cream; Body sprays; Essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Essential oils for use in manufacturing of candles, lip balm, shower gel, shampoo, conditioner; Face and body lotions; Non-medicated skin creams with essential oils for use in aromatherapy; Oils for perfumes and scents; Perfume; Perfume oils; Perfumed creams; Perfumed soaps; Scented body spray; Skin soap." It describes its essence as having been "created for the sole purpose of comfort and attraction" and marks its products with "Solace®".

According to the doTERRA website, doTERRA sells its product, a blend for women, as "Solace™". It describes its oil as "a proprietary blend of Certified Pure Therapeutic Grade® essential oils carefully formulated to balance hormones and manage symptoms of PMS and the transitional phases of menopause." (It also provides the disclaimer, required by the Food and Drug Administration, that the "product is not intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent disease.")

In its complaint, Ambre Blends contends that doTERRA willfully and intentionally used the Solace mark knowing both that the mark was the property of Ambre Blends and that such a use was unlawful. It further asserts that doTERRA's use of the mark was intended to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the general public and that doTERRA acted in bad faith.

The complaint asserts, inter alia, violations of the Lanham Act and unfair competition:

• Count I: Trademark Infringement
• Count II: False Designation of Origin
• Count III: Unfair Competition
• Count IV: Forgery
• Count V: Corrective Advertising Damages
• Count VI: Declaratory Judgment
• Count VII: Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief

Trademark counsel for Ambre Blends seeks a declaratory judgment; a preliminary injunction; a permanent injunction; damages, including treble damages; costs and attorney's fees; the transfer to Ambre Blends of any domain name that includes "Solace"; and corrective-advertising damages.

Practice Tip #1: From the complaint, this appears to be a straightforward case of infringement. However, Ambre Blends may have a tougher case than is obvious from the complaint itself. It appears from doTERRA's sales literature that doTERRA has used the mark "Solace" along with "™", thus claiming rights in the mark, at least as early as 2011. In contrast, Ambre Blends did not file its application until April 4, 2011; it was published for opposition on October 16, 2012. A federal registration confers a presumption of validity. However, here, the right to use the mark "Solace" may result in a battle of the facts.

Practice Tip #2: This complaint highlights the difference between the "®" mark and the "™" mark. While the former may not be used until a mark has been granted a federal registration, the latter has no such requirement. Instead, it may be used whenever a business wishes to put competitors on notice that it considers the mark to be its intellectual property.

Practice Tip #3: doTERRA is currently embroiled in litigation in both state and federal court in Utah with Young Living, another giant in the essential-oil industry.

Continue reading "Ambre Blends Sues doTERRA For Trademark Infringement of "Solace" " »

Washington, D.C. - As part of an ongoing dialogue with the high-tech innovation community, the U.S. Department of Commerce's United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") will host its next public Software Partnership Meeting on Thursday, December 5, 2013, at the USPTO campus in Alexandria, Virginia. Partnership Meetings are an opportunity to bring stakeholders together to share ideas, experiences, and insights and to provide a forum for informal discussion of many topics specific to the software community.

The USPTO received ideas from the public regarding future topics of discussion for enhancing the quality of software-related patents at the February Software Partnership Roundtables in Silicon Valley and New York, and from responses to a January 2013 Federal Register Notice. The public expressed an interest in exploring ways to improve the USPTO's prior art searching techniques and tools. In response to this input, the USPTO is holding the December 5 meeting, which will be webcast, to educate the public on the prior art resources utilized by its examiners. In addition, there will be presentations from selected external speakers on additional prior art resources and search techniques, which will be followed by a question and comments session. This meeting will be of particular interest to search professionals, practitioners interested in search resources, and software industry experts.

What: Software Partnership Meeting

When: Thursday, December 5, 2013 from 1:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. ET

Where: USPTO Madison Auditorium North 
            Concourse Level
            Alexandria, VA 22314

More information including directions, the meeting agenda, and RSVP details can be found on the Software Partnership page on the USPTO website:   www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/software_partnership.jsp.

For further information, please contact Seema Rao, Director, Technology Center 2100, via e-mail at seema.rao@uspto.gov, or by telephone at 571-272-0800.

Indianapolis, Indiana - Endotach LLC of Plano, Texas sued Cook Medical Inc. of Bloomington, Indiana alleging infringement of Endovascular Bypass Graft, U.S. Patent No. 5,122,154 (the "'154 patent") and Endovascular Stent with Secure Mounting Means, U.S. Patent No. 5,593,417 (the "'417 patent"; collectively, the "Rhodes patents") issued by the U.S. Patent Office. Endotach filed its complaint in the Northern District of Florida. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana upon Cook's request.

The patents at issue, both of which were issued in the 1990s, were granted to Dr. Valentine Rhodes, an award-winning surgeon who practiced in the field of vascular medicine for over 30 years. The patents are directed to intraluminal and endovascular grafts for placement within a blood vessel, duct or lumen to hold it open. As it pertains to this lawsuit, the patents-in-suit are used for revascularization of aneurysms or stenosis occurring in blood vessels which includes anchoring projections to aid in securing the graft in place within the blood vessel.

Upon the death of Dr. Rhodes, the patents-in-suit passed as part of his estate. Dr. Rhodes' Will bequeathed all "tangible personal property" to his wife, Brenda Rhodes ("Mrs. Rhodes"). However, there was no specific bequest of the Rhodes patents or mention of any intangible property. The Will's residuary clause bequeathed "all the residue of [Dr. Rhodes'] estate, real and personal" to a Trust (the "Rhodes Trust"). Upon Dr. Rhodes' death, his two daughters and Mrs. Rhodes became Co-Trustees of the Trust.

In November 2009, Mrs. Rhodes executed a document entitled "Exclusive License Agreement," listing herself as the "patent owner." The agreement purported to transfer an exclusive license on the '417 patent to Acacia Patent Acquisition LLC. That license was later assigned to Endotach and amended to include the '154 patent.

Endotach sued Cook in July 2012 asserting infringement of one or more claims in each of the patents-in-suit. In that complaint, it asserted that Mrs. Rhodes owned the patents-in-suit and that, as a result of the exclusive license Mrs. Rhodes had granted, Endotach had the right to enforce the patents against all infringers.

Cook moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguing that Endotach did not have standing to bring suit. On July 12, 2013, presumably in response to the motion, an "amendment" to the exclusive licensing agreement transferred an exclusive license on the Rhodes patents to Endotach from the Rhodes Trust. It was signed by Mrs. Rhodes and the other Co-Trustees.

In this opinion, Senior Judge Larry J. McKinney addressed Cook's contention that Endotach did not have standing to sue. The court concluded that Endotach did lack standing as Mrs. Rhodes did not have any individual property interest in the Rhodes patents at the time that she purported to convey an exclusive license. The court dismissed Endotach's lawsuit without prejudice.

Practice Tip #1: The principle of standing that is important in this case is whether or not Endotach had any legal rights and interests to the Rhodes patents at the time it filed suit. While there are some exceptions, in general, a plaintiff may not sue to assert rights held by third parties.

Practice Tip #2: Apparently realizing that the earlier effort to convey the license might be successfully challenged (as it was) and the case dismissed as a result (as it was), an additional complaint was filed on July 16, 2013, shortly after a new attempt was made to convey to Endotach an exclusive license to the patents-in-suit, this time by the Rhodes Trust. See here.

Continue reading "Endotach's Patent Infringement Lawsuit Against Cook Medical Dismissed for Lack of Standing" »

Indianapolis, Indiana - J & J Sports Productions, Inc. of Campbell, California ("J & J Sports") has sued Joseph M. Hubbard and Alison Kay, LLC, both of Indianapolis, Indiana and d/b/a Wing'N It in the Southern District of Indiana alleging the unlawful interception and broadcast of the Manny Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program.

J & J Sports states that it is the exclusive domestic commercial distributor of the Manny Pacquiao v. Juan Manuel Marquez, WBO Welterweight Championship Fight Program (the "program"). It has sued Alison Kay, which is listed on the complaint as the name of a limited liability company, as well as Joseph M. Hubbard as an individual, under the Communications Act of 1934 and The Cable & Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.

Specifically, Defendants have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553 by displaying the program on November 12, 2011 without a commercial license. Regarding the claim under 47 U.S.C. § 605, the complaint alleges that with "full knowledge that the Program was not to be intercepted, received, published, divulged, displayed, and/or exhibited by commercial entities unauthorized to do so, each and every one of the above named Defendants . . . did unlawfully intercept, receive, publish, divulge, display, and/or exhibit the Program" for the purpose of commercial advantage and/or private financial gain.

A count of conversion is also included which asserts that Defendants' acts were "willful, malicious, egregious, and intentionally designed to harm Plaintiff J & J Sports" and that, as a result of being deprived of their commercial license fee, J & J Sports suffered "severe economic distress and great financial loss."

In addition to naming the separate legal entity, Alison Kay, LLC, which apparently owns the restaurant, Plaintiff has also sued Hubbard alleging that he had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Wing'N It. J & J Sports asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of Plaintiff's program.

J & J Sports also contends that Hubbard specifically directed the employees of Wing'N It to unlawfully intercept and broadcast Plaintiff's program at Wing'N It or, if he did not, that the actions of the employees of Wing'N It are directly imputable to Hubbard by virtue of his purported responsibility for the activities of Wing'N It. Hubbard has also been named individually as a result of J & J Sports' contention that he is a managing member of Alison Kay, LLC. J & J further asserts that Hubbard, as an individual specifically identified on the liquor license for Wing'N It, had an obvious and direct financial interest in the activities of Wing'N It.

In the complaint, the intellectual property attorney for J & J Sports listed the following counts and requests for redress:

•Count I: Violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 605. For this count, J & J Sports requests (a) statutory damages for each willful violation in an amount to $100,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. 605(e)(3)(C)(ii), and (b) the recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).

•Count II: Violation of Title 47 U.S.C. § 553. For this count, J & J Sports asks the court for (a) statutory damages for each violation in an amount to $10,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(ii); (b) statutory damages for each willful violation in an amount to $50,000.00 pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B); (c) the recovery of full costs pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 (c)(2)(C); and (d) and in the discretion of the court, reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to Title 47 U.S.C. § 553 (c)(2)(C).

•Count III: Conversion. For this count, the court is requested to order both compensatory and punitive damages from Defendants as the result of the Defendants' allegedly egregious conduct, theft, and conversion of the program and deliberate injury to the Plaintiff.

Practice Tip #1: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #2: As part of its complaint, J & J Sports claims that the Defendants' actions have subjected it to "severe economic distress and great financial loss." It will be interesting to see what evidence it offers as proof that, as a result of allegedly not receiving its full commercial fee for the programming purportedly displayed by the Defendants - a circumstance presumably known to few other than the Defendants themselves - it has suffered severe economic distress and great financial loss.

Continue reading "J & J Sports Sues Wing'N It and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of Championship Fight" »

Indianapolis, Indiana - An intellectual property lawyer for Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Alice Baldwin and two limited liability companies, all of Evansville, Indiana and doing business as Bucks Tavern, unlawfully intercepted and broadcast the "Rousey v. Carmouche" championship fight.

Joe Hand Promotions was granted rights to distribute via closed-circuit television and encrypted satellite signal the Ultimate Fighting Championship ("UFC") "Rousey v. Carmouche" fight (the "Program"), which was telecast nationwide on February 23, 2013.

In the complaint against Baldwin and Bucks Tavern, intellectual property counsel for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and "tortuous" [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entities which apparently own Bucks Tavern, Joe Hand Promotions has also sued Baldwin as an individual, claiming that she owns those legal entities and that she had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Bucks Tavern. Plaintiff asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its UFC Program. It further claims that Bucks Tavern and Baldwin received financial benefit from the unlawful display of the Program.

Baldwin and the Bucks Tavern entities have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Productions seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $60,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory and punitive damages on the claim of conversion; and costs and attorney's fees. These claims have been made both against Bucks Tavern and as personal liability claims against Baldwin.

Practice Tip #1: Joe Hand Productions has sued three entities: two limited liability companies and an individual who is allegedly a principal in both. While limited liability companies are intended, as the name suggests, to limit the liability of the principals, they are not always successful in doing so. Where a principal is personally involved in certain types of illegal activity, legal mechanisms (such as a limited liability company) that are designed to shield the principal from liability may fail to do so. Unfortunately for Baldwin, it is likely that she, as an individual, will be the primary target of this lawsuit as, according to the complaint, it seems that both of the limited liability companies have been administratively dissolved, making their inclusion as defendants likely irrelevant.

Practice Tip #2: While on the surface this appears to be a copyright case, an allegation of interception under 47 U.S.C. § 605 is a different cause of action from copyright infringement. However, a suit alleging interception does not preclude an additional lawsuit alleging different causes of action. For example, the copyright holder can also sue for copyright infringement, which could increase damages by as much as $150,000.

Practice Tip #3: Joe Hand Promotions is a frequent litigant and has brought several cases in recent years against defendants alleged to have illegally intercepted and/or broadcast UFC fights. Indiana Intellectual Property Law News has previously blogged on the cases below:

• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Fishbowl Pub and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of UFC Fight
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Ho Bo Jungle Bar Over Unauthorized Interception of the Ultimate Fighting Championship Broadcast
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Lawrenceburg, Indiana Bar for Showing UFC Fight Without Authorization
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Beerbelly's over Interception of Broadcast Signal
• Joe Hand Promotions Sues Longwell and Pitt Stop Pub & Grill for Intercepting UFC Broadcast

Continue reading "Joe Hand Promotions Sues Bucks Tavern and its Owner for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of Championship Fight" »

New Albany, Indiana - WindStream Technologies, Inc. of North Vernon, Indiana filed a trademark infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Rambo LLC, Rambo Montrow Corporation (collectively, "Rambo") and Rick Keebler, all of Madison, Indiana, as well as ten unidentified John Does residing in Indiana, infringed its trademarked TurboMill, Trademark Registration No. 3,986,494, which has been registered by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

WindStream manufactures wind turbines for municipal, residential and commercial use. Those turbines are shipped worldwide from its Indiana manufacturing facility. It contracted with Rambo and Keebler, who is asserted to be a principal of the Rambo entities, to provide component parts and to act as an authorized dealer of TurboMill turbines in certain territories.

WindStream has multiple contractual disputes with Defendants and Defendants' predecessors in interest and asserts that component parts in which WindStream has an interest are being held "hostage" in an attempt to renegotiate the terms of one of the contracts. Further, WindStream contends that the failure of Defendants to deliver the parts has damaged its business. WindStream also charges Defendants with unfair competition, claiming that they are selling WindStream products, including WindStream's TurboMill, as their own. Finally, it asserts that, among the prospective customers that Keebler and Rambo are targeting are individuals and entities that had previously been identified by WindStream as potential customers.

In its complaint, filed by the trademark attorney for WindStream, the following counts are alleged:

• Federal Unfair Competition and Passing Off (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a))
• Trademark Infringement (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
• Breach of Contract (Dealer Agreement)
• Breach of Contract (Purchase Orders)
• Interference with Contract and Prospective Economic Advantage

WindStream asks the court for an injunction prohibiting trademark infringement and similar conduct; damages, including treble damages; punitive damages for Defendants' willful and malicious acts; and attorney's fees and costs of the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: The complaint asserts that the trademark for TurboMill was registered on June 28, 2001 and that the mark has been used in commerce since at least 2009. In contrast, the registration is listed by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office as having occurred on June 28, 2011 with the mark shown as having first been used in commerce in 2011, the same year in which WindStream began manufacturing its wind turbines. While the former inconsistency, which adds exactly ten years to the apparent life of the trademark, can be assumed to be a typographical error, the origin of the latter inconsistency, which adds another two years to the period during which the TurboMill mark is claimed to have been used in commerce, in unclear.

Continue reading "WindStream Sues Rambo and Keebler for Trademark Infringement" »

New Albany, Indiana - Silver Streak Industries, LLC of Tempe, Arizona ("Silver Streak") has filed a copyright infringement lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Squire Boone Caverns, Inc. of Floyd County, Indiana ("Squire Boone") infringed the copyrighted work Ore Car display and game card which has been registered by the U.S. Copyright Office.

Silver Streak's Ore Car display and game card (the "Work"), a whimsical representation of a mining ore car used to display polished stones and an accompanying brochure that lists the type of stones displayed, was copyrighted in 1995. Retail consumers may select stones for purchase. They are able to keep track of each type of stone collected with the brochure. Silver Streak generates revenue through the sales of copies of the Work to third parties retail establishments, such as travel centers, and through re-supply of the polished stones displayed with the Work.

Silver Streak alleges that, within the nine-month period prior to the filing of this action for copyright infringement, Squire Boone deliberately and willfully infringed Silver Streak's copyright in the Work by producing an "Ore Car and Tumbled Stone" product, which it claims infringes the copyrighted Ore Car display.

Intellectual property attorneys for Silver Streak contend that Squire Boone offered its purportedly infringing product to one of Silver Streak's existing customers at a retail-merchandise trade show in early 2013 at a deeply discounted price. It also asserts that Squire Boone has made at least one sale of the Ore Car to Six Flags, a potential customer of Silver Streak.

In its complaint, Silver Streak lists two causes of action:

• Count I: Copyright Infringement
• Count II: Tortious Interference with Contract

Silver Streak asks the court to impound and destroy all copies of the allegedly infringing work;
enjoin Squire Boone from further infringement; enjoin Squire Boone from unlawfully interfering with existing or prospective contracts between Silver Streak and its customers; order an accounting of profits and other damages that resulted from copyright infringement or interference with contract and prospective advantage; award to Silver Streak actual damages and profits under 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) and § 504(b), or in the alternative, statutory damages for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504 (a)(2) and § 504(c); award punitive damages; and award to Silver Streak its costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Practice Tip: The Copyright Act empowers a plaintiff to elect to receive an award of statutory damages between $750 and $30,000 per infringement in lieu of an award representing the plaintiff's actual damages and/or the defendant's profits. In a case where the copyright owner proves that infringement was committed willfully (as was asserted here), the court may increase the award of statutory damages to as much as $150,000 per infringed work. A finding of willful infringement will also support an award of attorney's fees.

Continue reading "Silver Streak Industries Sues Squire Boone Caverns for Copyright Infringement" »

The US Trademark Office issued the following 119 trademark registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in October, 2013, based on applications filed by Indiana Trademark Attorneys:

Continue reading "119 Trademark Registrations Issued to Indiana Companies in October, 2013" »

The US Patent Office issued the following 198 patent registrations to persons and businesses in Indiana in October, 2013, based on applications filed by Indiana Patent Attorneys:

Continue reading "Patent Office Issues 198 Patents To Indiana Citizens in October, 2013" »

Indianapolis, Indiana - Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. of Feasterville, Pennsylvania has sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Timothy H. Fishburn of Marion County, Indiana; David M. Rickelman of Morgan County, Indiana and MWCC, Inc. d/b/a Fishbowl Pub At Midwest Sports Complex of Indianapolis, Indiana unlawfully intercepted and broadcast the Ultimate Fighting Championship "Aldo v. Hominick" Program.

Joe Hand Promotions was granted rights to distribute via closed-circuit television and encrypted satellite signal the Ultimate Fighting Championship ("UFC") "Aldo vs. Hominick" fight ("the Program"), which was telecast nationwide on April 30, 2011.

In the complaint against Fishburn, Rickelman and Fishbowl Pub, intellectual property counsel for Joe Hand Promotions has alleged such wrongful acts as interception, reception, publication, divulgence, display, exhibition, and "tortuous" [sic] conversion of the Program.

In addition to naming the separate legal entity, MWCC, Inc., which apparently owns Fishbowl Pub, Plaintiff has also sued Fishburn and Rickelman as individuals, claiming that they own MWCC and that they had the right and ability to supervise the activities of Fishbowl Pub. Plaintiff asserts that those activities included the unlawful interception of its Program. It further claims that Fishbowl Pub and its owners received financial benefit from the unlawful display of the Program.

Defendants have been accused of violating 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 47 U.S.C. § 553. The complaint also lists a count of conversion. Joe Hand Productions seeks statutory damages of $110,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605; $60,000 for each willful violation of 47 U.S.C. § 553; compensatory damages on the claim of conversion; and costs and attorney's fees. These claims have been made both against Fishbowl Pub and as personal liability claims against the owners.

Practice Tip #1: Among its assertions of wrongdoing, Joe Hand Productions has alleged interception of the Program under 47 U.S.C. § 605, which is a different cause of action from copyright infringement.

Practice Tip #2: When Congress passed the Cable Communication Act, a statute of limitations was not included. Some federal courts have determined that a two-year statute of limitation is appropriate while other federal courts have used a three-year statute of limitations. The alleged wrongdoing here occurred on April 30, 2011. If the court interprets the interception claim to have a two-year statute of limitations, this may pose a problem for the Plaintiff, as the complaint was filed on October 15, 2013.

Practice Tip #3: It is unclear precisely what unlawful act is being alleged in this complaint. In the paragraph 12, it is asserted that Defendants wrongfully intercepted and broadcast the UFC "Aldo vs. Hominick" fight. However, in paragraph 32, the Plaintiff requests a finding of unauthorized exhibition of the "St-Pierre v. Sheilds Broadcast," which is presumably a different program.

Overhauser Law Offices, the publisher of this website, has represented several hundred persons and businesses accused of infringing satellite signals.

Continue reading "Joe Hand Promotions Sues Fishbowl Pub and its Owners for Unlawful Interception and Broadcast of UFC Fight" »