Declaratory Judgments

December 16, 2015

Indiana Copyright Litigation: Remaining Copyright Defendants in Bell Lawsuit to be Dismissed

Indianapolis, Indiana – District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the Southern District of Indiana denied Plaintiff’s request for partial summary judgment for declaratory relief and injunctive relief against Defendants in a copyright dispute over the use of Plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph of Indianapolis.

This lawsuit dates back to June 7, 2011 when Plaintiff Richard N. Bell of McCordsville, Indiana sued 22 Defendants for alleged infringement of his copyrighted photo, U.S. Copyright Registration No. VA0001785115. Bell amended his complaint multiple times, with the third amended complaint becoming the operative pleading on December 6, 2012.

In May 2013, the litigation was severed into three separate cases, including the one that is the subject of this opinion. In this lawsuit, Bell, who is both an Indiana copyright attorney and a professional photographer, accused Defendants Insurance Concepts, Fred O’Brien and Shanna Cheatham of copyright infringement. Bell sought injunctive relief along with damages, costs and attorney’s fees.

A prior opinion by the court held for these Defendants on the issues of Bell’s state law claims and copyright damages claims. In this order, the court addressed the parties’ cross motions for partial summary judgment on the remaining issues – declaratory and injunctive relief.

The court first cited the four-factor test necessary to obtain an injunction, which states that a plaintiff must show:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

The court noted that in a prior ruling, it had concluded that Bell had failed to establish any damages, including no damages that would rise to the level of “irreparable injury.” Consequently, the first factor was not met. The court then opined that an injunction was also unwarranted under the second factor, as Bell could again institute litigation upon finding any future copyright violations by a Defendant. Having found that at least two of the four elements required for an injunction were missing, the court declined to address the remaining factors.

The court similarly declined to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief on the grounds that, after having been notified, the Defendants had promptly removed the copyrighted photo and, moreover, the websites on which the photo had been published no longer existed. As such, it concluded that there was no “substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”

The court consequently denied Plaintiff Bell’s motion for partial summary judgment and his request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted.

Practice Tip:

• Attorney/Photographer Sues Georgia Real Estate Company for Infringing Copyrighted Photo
• Sovereign Immunity May Take a Toll on Bell’s Latest Copyright Lawsuit
• Appellate Court Dismisses Copyright Appeal as Premature
• Bell Rings in the Holiday Weekend with a New Copyright Lawsuit
• Bell Files New Copyright Infringement Lawsuit
• Bell Sues Georgia-Base FindTicketsFast.com for Copyright Infringement
• Richard Bell Files Two New Copyright Infringement Lawsuits
• Court Prevents Copyright Plaintiff Bell from Outmaneuvering Legal System; Orders Bell to Pay Almost $34,000 in Fees and Costs
• Three Default Judgments of $2,500 Ordered for Copyright Infringement

• Court Orders Severance of Misjoined Copyright Infringement Complaint

• Richard Bell Files Another Copyright Infringement Lawsuit

October 27, 2015

Indiana Intellectual Property Litigation: Roche Seeks Declaration of Non-Infringement of Meso’s Rights to ECL Technology

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – Indiana intellectual property attorneys for Plaintiff Roche Diagnostics Corporation of Indianapolis, Indiana filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana asking for a declaration of non-infringement of rights to patented technology licensed to Defendant Meso Scale Diagnostics, LLC of Rockville, Maryland.

At issue in this patent-related lawsuit is the right to use patented Electrochemiluminescence (“ECL”) technology owned by BioVeris Corporation. ECL is a detection technology that uses electricity, chemistry and light to detect and measure the presence of specific molecules in a test sample. It is used to detect, monitor, and guide the treatment of disease and other conditions.

In 1995, BioVeris licensed its ECL technology to Defendant Meso. Under this license, Meso was granted an exclusive license to use ECL technology for certain limited purposes. BioVeris later entered licensing agreements granting Roche Diagnostics use of ECL technology. Meso contends that Roche Diagnostics’ use of BioVeris’ ECL technology constitutes a violation of the exclusive rights granted to Meso. Roche Diagnostics asserts that its use does not violate Meso’s rights under the Meso license and that, while Meso was not a party to the first agreement licensing the ECL technology to Roche Diagnostics, executed in 2003, Meso expressly consented to that entire agreement. A second agreement licensing the technology was executed between BioVeris and Roche Diagnostics in 2007.

In 2013, a related dispute between Miso and Roche Diagnostics in Delaware state court was resolved in favor of Roche Diagnostics after a five-day bench trial. That judgment was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in June 2015. Roche Diagnostics claims that, this concluded lawsuit notwithstanding, Meso continues to assert that Roche Diagnostics’ activities infringe Meso’s rights and continues to threaten litigation.

Indiana patent lawyers for Roche Diagnostics filed this action for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment declaring that it has not infringed Meso’s license rights in the ECL technology. Roche also seeks an award of attorney’s fees and costs.

Practice Tip: Because the validity of the BioVeris’ patents is not in dispute, and because Roche Diagnostics concedes that some of its products include BioVeris’ patented ECL technology, BioVeris was not included as a party in this lawsuit.

August 26, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Court Permits Bonutti to Withdraw Counterclaim, Denies Attorneys’ Fees to Biomet

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Hammond, Indiana – In the matter of Biomet, Inc. v. Bonutti Skeletal Innovations, LLC, the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division granted Defendant Bonutti’s motion to dismiss with prejudice its counterclaim. Bonutti’s counterclaim alleged that Biomet had infringed U.S. Patent No. 7,806,897 (the “‘897 patent”). Patent attorneys for Biomet Inc. asked the court to impose attorneys’ fees as a condition of the dismissal but this motion was denied.

On March 8, 2013, patent lawyers for Plaintiff Biomet filed an action for declaratory judgment against Bonutti Skeletal Innovations LLC. At issue were contentions of patent infringement of fifteen patents. Bonutti counterclaimed against Biomet and several other counterclaim Defendants. This multi-faceted dispute had been resolved with respect to some of the patents prior to this order. Other allegations of patent infringement remained.

Among the assertions by Bonutti that had remained was a counterclaim that Biomet had infringed the ‘897 patent. In this order, the court granted Bonutti’s request under Rule 41(a)(2) to dismiss this counterclaim with prejudice. The court also addressed Biomet’s contention that it should be awarded attorneys’ fees as a “prevailing party” in this portion of the patent litigation.

The court denied attorneys’ fees to Biomet on several grounds. First, it noted that, while attorney’s fees are available as part of a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal without prejudice, this is justified as compensation for requiring a defendant to incur unnecessary litigation expenses. That same rationale does not apply where, as in this case, the dismissal is with prejudice.

Additionally, the court noted that any request for attorneys’ fees was premature. Such fees are only available to the “prevailing party” and Biomet had not established itself as such a prevailing party. Biomet may yet be able to recover attorneys’ fees if, at the conclusion of the patent lawsuit, Biomet is held to be the prevailing party.

August 6, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Lilly Asks Indiana Court to Rule That It Has Not Infringed Patent

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana patent attorney for Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana filed a patent-related lawsuit against Uropep Biotech GbR of Garbsen, Germany in the Southern District of Indiana.

Plaintiff Lilly is in the business of, among other things, the manufacture and sale of various pharmaceuticals including a drug trademarked as Cialis®. At issue in this intellectual property lawsuit is U.S. Patent No. 8,791,124, entitled “Use of Phosphordiesterase Inhibitors in the Treatment of Prostatic Diseases” (“the ‘124 patent”), which has been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Lilly states that the ‘124 patent was issued to Defendant Uropep Biotech. Lilly further states in this Indiana lawsuit that an entity related to Uropep Biotech, Erfindergemeinschaft UroPep GbR, sued Lilly last month in the Eastern District of Texas asserting that Lilly had infringed the ‘124 patent by manufacturing and selling Cialis.

Lilly contends that Erfindergemeinschaft does not own the patent-in-suit and that, consequently, the Texas lawsuit was improper. It further asserts that the Texas lawsuit provides evidence of an actual and justiciable controversy between Lilly and Uropep Biotech sufficient to warrant this instant Indiana lawsuit wherein the Indiana patent lawyer for Lilly asks the court for declaratory relief adjudging that it has not infringed the ‘124 patent. Lilly also asks the court for a declaration that the ‘124 patent is invalid as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

July 7, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Lilly and Lupin in Federal Court Anew, Patent Infringement of Axiron Now Alleged

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – In conjunction with non-Indiana co-counsel, an Indiana patent attorney for Eli Lilly and Company, Eli Lilly Export S.A. (collectively, “Lilly”) and Acrux DDS Pty Ltd., sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Lupin Ltd. of Mubai, India and Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of Baltimore, Maryland infringed on various of Plaintiffs’ patents, including U.S. Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520. These patents have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Lilly is engaged in the business of research, development, manufacture and sale of

pharmaceutical products worldwide. Acrux is engaged in the development and commercialization of pharmaceutical products. They sell their products worldwide. The Lupin Defendants are generic pharmaceutical companies that develop, manufacture, market, and distribute generic pharmaceutical products for sale.

At issue in this patent litigation are U.S. Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520. These patents are alleged to cover a testosterone metered transdermal solution used to treat males for conditions associated with a deficiency or absence of endogenous testosterone. This pharmaceutical product, trademarked as Axiron®, is marketed and sold by Lilly.

Plaintiffs contend that the Abbreviated New Drug Application No. 208061 submitted in the name of Lupin Ltd. to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for approval to market a generic version of Lilly’s Axiron product constitutes patent infringement.

In its complaint, filed by an Indiana patent lawyer, Lilly alleges the following counts:

• Count I for Patent Infringement: Direct Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,419,307
• Count II for Patent Infringement: Inducement To Infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,419,307
• Count III for Patent Infringement: Contributory Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,419,307
• Count IV for Patent Infringement: Direct Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,177,449
• Count V for Patent Infringement: Inducement To Infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,177,449
• Count VI for Patent Infringement: Contributory Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,177,449
• Count VII for Patent Infringement: Direct Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,435,944
• Count VIII for Patent Infringement: Inducement To Infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,435,944
• Count IX for Patent Infringement: Contributory Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,435,944
• Count X for Patent Infringement: Direct Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,807,861
• Count XI for Patent Infringement: Inducement To Infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,807,861
• Count XII for Patent Infringement: Contributory Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,807,861
• Count XIII for Patent Infringement: Direct Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,993,520
• Count XIV for Patent Infringement: Inducement To Infringe U.S. Patent No. 8,993,520
• Count XV for Patent Infringement: Contributory Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,993,520
• Count XVI for Declaratory Judgment: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,419,307
• Count XVII for Declaratory Judgment: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,177,449
• Count XVIII for Declaratory Judgment: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,435,944
• Count XIX for Declaratory Judgment: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,807,861

• Count XX for Declaratory Judgment: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,993,520

Plaintiffs ask the court for judgment in their favor as follows:

a) United States Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520 are valid and enforceable;
b) Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A), Defendants infringed United States Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520 by submitting ANDA No. 208061 to the FDA to obtain approval to commercially manufacture, use, offer for sale, sell, or import into the United States Lupin’s Generic Product prior to expiration of said patents;
c) Defendants’ threatened acts of commercial manufacture, use, offer for sale, or sale in, or importation into, the United States of Lupin’s Generic Product prior to the expiration of United States Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520 would constitute infringement of said patents;
d) The effective date of any FDA approval of Lupin’s Generic Product shall be no earlier than the latest of the expiration date of United States Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520 and any additional periods of exclusivity, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A)
e) Defendants, and all persons acting in concert with Defendants, shall be enjoined from commercially manufacturing, using, offering for sale, or selling Lupin’s Generic Product within the United States, or importing Lupin’s Generic Product into the United States, until the expiration of United States Patent Nos. 8,419,307; 8,177,449; 8,435,944; 8,807,861; and 8,993,520 in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(e)(4)(B) and 283;) This is an exceptional case and Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs, expenses, and disbursements in this action, including reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. §§ 285 and 271(e)(4); and

g) Plaintiffs are entitled to any further appropriate relief under 35 U.S.C.§ 271(e)(4).

The case was assigned to Judge Sarah Evans Barker and Magistrate Judge Debra McVicker Lynch in the Southern District of Indiana and assigned Case No. 1:15-cv-01047-SEB-DML.

Practice Tip: Information on Lilly’s lawsuit against the Lupin Defendants, which asserts patent infringement relating to the drug Effient, can be found here.

May 26, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Lilly Files a New Complaint Against HEC Pharm for Infringement of Effient Patents

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana patent attorney for Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana; Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan; Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. of Parsippany, New Jersey; and Ube Industries, Ltd of Yamaguchi, Japan filed a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that HEC Pharm USA, Inc. of Princeton, New Jersey and HEC Pharm Co. Ltd. of Yichang, China, infringed Patent Nos. 8,404,703 and 8,569,325, which cover the patented pharmaceutical Effient (pictured left). These patents have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Effient products were approved by the FDA for the reduction of thrombotic cardiovascular events in certain patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) who are to be managed with percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI, or angioplasty). Effient products contain prasugrel hydrochloride, which is also known as 5-[(1RS)-2-cyclopropyl-1-(2-fluorophenyl)-2-oxoethyl]-4,5,6,7-tetrahydrothieno[3,2-c]pyridin-2-yl acetate hydrochloride.

The instructions accompanying Effient products state that patients taking Effient products should also take aspirin. The use of Effient products in combination with aspirin for the reduction of thrombotic cardiovascular events in patients with ACS who are to be managed with PCI is allegedly covered by the claims of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents.

In July 2014, Plaintiffs sued Defendants asserting infringement of the ‘703 patent. That complaint asserted patent infringement arising out of the filing by HEC Pharm of an Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) with the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) seeking approval to manufacture and sell generic versions of two pharmaceutical products – Effient 5mg and Effient 10mg tablets – prior to the expiration of the ‘703 patent. This patent covers a method of using Effient products for which Lilly claims an exclusively license. Specifically, HEC Pharm was accused of planning to infringe the patent-in-suit by including with its products instructions for use that substantially copied the instructions for Effient products, including instructions for administering HEC Pharm’s products with aspirin as claimed in the ‘703 patent.

Plaintiffs contended in this earlier lawsuit that HEC Pharm knew that the instructions that HEC Pharm intended to include with its products would induce and/or contribute to others using those products in the allegedly infringing manner set forth in the instructions. Moreover, Lilly et al. also contended that HEC Pharm specifically intended for health care providers, and/or patients to use HEC Pharm’s products in accordance with the instructions provided by HEC Pharm and that such use would directly infringe one or more claims of the ‘703 patent. Thus, stated Plaintiffs, HEC Pharm’s actions would actively induce and/or contribute to infringement of the ‘703 patent.

This prior complaint, also filed by the Indiana patent lawyer who filed this lawsuit, listed two counts:

• Count I: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,404,703

• Count II: Declaratory Judgment of Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,404,703

That patent infringement lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice shortly thereafter. It has in effect been replaced with this current complaint, which includes the prior counts and adds the following:

• Count III: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,569,325

• Count IV: Declaratory Judgment of Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,569,325

Plaintiffs ask the court for: a judgment of infringement; injunctive relief; a judgment regarding the effective date of Defendants’ ANDA; monetary damages; the case to be deemed exceptional; a judgment that the patents-in-suit remain valid and enforceable; and Plaintiffs to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses.

May 18, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Klink Trucking Sues Seaboard Asphalt for Declaration of Non-Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Klink Trucking Inc., K-Tech Specialty Coatings, Inc., BIT MAT Products of Indiana, Inc. and BIT MAT Products of Michigan, Inc. (collectively the “Klink Group”), all of Ashley, Indiana, initiated an intellectual property lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that Seaboard Asphalt Products Company (“Seaboard Asphalt”) of Baltimore, Maryland wrongly accused Klink Group of infringing Seaboard Asphalt’s patented “Trackless Tack Coat,” Patent No. 8,764,340, which has been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

Seaboard Asphalt claims ownership of U.S. Patent No. 8,764,340 for a “Trackless Tack Coat” (“the ‘340 patent”). This patent protects an “asphalt emulsion available for high performing, trackless tack coat applications. The tack coat can be used with hot mix asphalt, warm mix asphalt or cold mix asphalt to provide a tack coat on an existing bituminous or concrete pavement surface. The tack coat can also be used for repair of potholes, utility cuts, and general pavement patching areas.”

On April 28, 2015, Seaboard Asphalt contacted Klink Group. According to a document filed with the Indiana court, Seaboard Asphalt stated that it believed that Klink Group’s “AE-NT Trackless Tack Coat” infringed Seaboard Asphalt’s ‘340 patent and requested that Klink Group “discontinue production and distribution for sale of your AE-NT and all versions of Trackless Tack Coat which violate our Patent” until Klink Group and Seaboard Asphalt had entered into a licensing agreement.

This Indiana litigation arises from that assertion and request by Seaboard Asphalt. Klink Group asserts that it has no liability for infringement of the ‘340 patent because none of the Klink Group entities have infringed any valid and enforceable claim of the ‘340 patent. Plaintiffs have sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act. They ask the Indiana federal court for two declarations with respect to the patent-in-suit:

• Count I – Declaration of Non-Infringement

• Count II – Declaration of Invalidity

Plaintiffs also ask the court to declare this case to be exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and, pursuant to such a declaration, to award to Plaintiffs its reasonable attorneys’ fees, expenses and costs relating to this patent litigation.

April 29, 2015

Indiana Patent Litigation: Eli Lilly Again in Federal Court Asserting Patent Infringement

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana – An Indiana patent lawyer for Eli Lilly and Company of Indianapolis, Indiana; Daiichi Sankyo Co., Ltd. of Tokyo, Japan; Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. of Parsippany, New Jersey; and Ube Industries, Ltd of Yamaguchi, Japan (collectively “Lilly”) sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Lupin Ltd. of Mumbai, India and Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. of Baltimore, Maryland infringed Patent Nos. 8,569,325, titled Method of Treatment with Coadministration of Aspirin and Prasugrel and 8,404,703, titled Medicinal Compositions Containing Aspirin, which have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office.

This lawsuit adds another two new Defendants, Lupin Ltd. and Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (collectively “Lupin”), to Lilly’s Indiana patent litigation efforts. In these “Effient” patent-infringement lawsuits, the Lilly group of Plaintiffs alleges infringement of its pharmaceutical product Effient. The patents at issue in the Lupin litigation are Effient-related patents 8,404,703 “Medicinal Compositions Containing Aspirin,” (the “‘703 patent”) and 8,569,325 “Method of Treatment with Coadministration of Aspirin and Prasugrel” (the “‘325 patent”).

This complaint asserts patent infringement arising out of the filing by Lupin of an Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) with the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) seeking approval to manufacture and sell generic versions of two pharmaceutical products – Effient 5mg and Effient 10mg tablets – prior to the expiration of the ‘703 patent and the ‘325 patent. These patents cover two Effient products and/or methods of using Effient products and for which Lilly claims an exclusively license.

Effient products were approved by the FDA for the reduction of thrombotic cardiovascular events in certain patients with acute coronary syndrome (ACS) who are to be managed with percutaneous coronary intervention (PCI, or angioplasty). Effient products contain prasugrel hydrochloride, which is also known as 5-[(1RS)-2-cyclopropyl-1-(2-fluorophenyl)-2-oxoethyl]-4,5,6,7-tetrahydrothieno[3,2-c]pyridin-2-yl acetate hydrochloride or 2-acetoxy-5-(alpha-cyclopropylcarbonyl-2-fluorobenzy1)-4,5,6,7-tetrahydrothieno[3,2-c]pyridine hydrochloride, and is covered by the ‘726 patent.

The instructions accompanying Effient products state that patients taking Effient products should also take aspirin. The use of Effient products in combination with aspirin for the reduction of thrombotic cardiovascular events in patients with ACS who are to be managed with PCI is allegedly covered by the claims of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents.

Lupin is accused of planning to infringe the patents-in-suit by including with its products instructions for use that substantially copy the instructions for Effient products, including instructions for administering Lupin’s products with aspirin as claimed in the ‘703 and ‘325 patents.

Plaintiffs contend that Lupin knows that the instructions that Lupin intends to include with its products will induce and/or contribute to others using those products in the allegedly infringing manner set forth in the instructions. Moreover, the Lilly Plaintiffs also contend that Lupin specifically intends for health care providers, and/or patients to use Lupin’s products in accordance with the instructions provided by Lupin and that such use will directly infringe one or more claims of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents. Thus, state Plaintiffs, Lupin’s actions will actively induce and/or contribute to infringement of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents.

The complaint, filed by an Indiana patent attorney, lists four counts:

• Count I: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,404,703
• Count II: Declaratory Judgment of Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,404,703
• Count III: Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,569,325

• Count IV: Declaratory Judgment of Infringement of U.S. Patent No. 8,569,325

Plaintiffs ask the court for judgment:

• That Lupin has infringed the ‘703 patent and/or will infringe, actively induce infringement of, and/or contribute to infringement by others of one or more claims of the ‘703 patent;

• That Lupin has infringed the ‘325 patent and/or will infringe, actively induce infringement of, and/or contribute to infringement by others of one or more claims of the ‘325 patent;

• That, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B), Lupin be permanently enjoined from making, using, selling or offering to sell any of its accused products within the United States, or, where applicable, importing accused products into the United States prior to the expiration of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents;

• That, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A), the effective date of any approval of the Lupin ANDA under § 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 355(j)) shall not be earlier than the later of the expiration dates of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents, including any extensions;

• If Lupin commercially makes, uses, sells or offers to sell any accused product within the United States, or, where applicable, imports any accused product into the United States, prior to the expiration of either of the ‘703 and ‘325 patents, including any extensions, that Plaintiffs be awarded monetary damages for those infringing acts to the fullest extent allowed by law and be awarded prejudgment interest based on those monetary damages;

• That the case be deemed exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285;

• That the ‘703 patent remains valid and enforceable;

• That the ‘325 patent remains valid and enforceable; and

• That Plaintiffs be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses.

November 19, 2014

Indiana Copyright Law: Seventh Circuit Holds that Subsequent Copyrighted Works Do Not Extend Copyright Period for Earlier Works

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Chicago, Illinois – California attorney Leslie S. Klinger, co-editor of multiple collections of annotated works based on Arthur Conan Doyle‘s Sherlock Holmes fiction sued Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd. under the Declaratory Judgment Act in the Northern District of Illinois seeking a declaratory judgment that he may freely use material from those Sherlock Holmes works for which copyright protection has expired. The district court held that Klinger’s use of material that was no longer subject to copyright was permissible. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Arthur Conan Doyle published 56 stories and 4 novels featuring the fictional character Sherlock Holmes. Of these stories, only the final 10, published between 1923 and 1927, are still protected by copyright.

Leslie Klinger, Plaintiff-Appellee, co-edited an anthology called A Study in Sherlock: Stories Inspired by the Sherlock Holmes Canon. Klinger had not sought a license from Doyle’s estate, presuming that one was not necessary, as the copyrights on most of the works in the “canon” had expired. The estate disagreed and demanded that Random House, which had agreed to publish Klinger’s book, pay $5,000 for a copyright license. Random House acquiesced and, in 2011, the anthology was published.

The trouble began when Klinger and his co-editor decided to create a sequel, “In the Company of Sherlock Holmes” and entered into negotiations with Pegasus Books, a publisher. The Doyle estate again demanded a fee for a copyright license and threatened to interfere with distribution of the book if that copyright license fee was not paid, telling Pegasus, “If you proceed instead to bring out Study in Sherlock II [the original title of “In the Company of Sherlock Holmes”] unlicensed, do not expect to see it offered for sale by Amazon, Barnes & Noble, and similar retailers. We work with those compan[ies] routinely to weed out unlicensed uses of Sherlock Holmes from their offerings, and will not hesitate to do so with your book as well.” No threat of a lawsuit for copyright infringement was explicitly made. Pegasus subsequently refused to publish the book unless and until Klinger obtained a copyright license from the Doyle estate.

Instead of purchasing a license, Klinger sued the estate seeking a declaratory judgment that he could freely use any material from the Sherlock Holmes works for which the period of copyright protection had expired.

The district court held in Klinger’s favor. The estate appealed to the Seventh Circuit on two alternative grounds. The estate first contended that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act because there was no “actual case or controversy.” Second, it asserted that a copyright on a “complex” character, whose full complexity is not revealed until a later story, remains protected under copyright law until the later story falls into the public domain.

Circuit Judge Posner, writing for the court, rejected both arguments. The “case or controversy,” necessary for federal jurisdiction was demonstrated by the estate’s “twin threats” of blocking the distribution of the book and the implied threat of a copyright lawsuit against the publisher, Klinger and the book’s co-editor for copyright infringement if the book were published without a license. That such a case or controversy existed was also demonstrated by the fact that Klinger could have sued on a claim of tortious interference with advantageous business relations as a result of the estate’s intimidation of his publisher.

The court then considered the question of “whether copyright protection of a fictional character can be extended beyond the expiration of the copyright on it because the author altered the character in a subsequent work.” The estate urged the court to grant additional copyright protection in its case, arguing that characters such as Sherlock Holmes were “round” and/or “complex” and thus deserving of greater shelter under copyright law than fictional characters that were “flat” and/or “simple.”

The court could find no basis in statute or case law to support the extension of a copyright beyond its expiration. Thus, it affirmed the uncontested matter of copyright protection for the later works – namely, a right to recover for copyright infringement still existed for some portions of the Sherlock Holmes works for which the copyrights had not yet expired. However, that protection was limited to only those elements of the later Sherlock Holmes works that included “incremental additions of originality.” The remainder, the court opined, had passed into the public domain, regardless of the dimensions of the characters portrayed.

Practice Tip: The court was also unpersuaded by the Doyle estate’s argument to extend copyright law on the grounds that failure to do so would diminish authors’ incentives to create. After noting that Arthur Conan Doyle had died 84 years prior, thus rendering the argument inapplicable in the current litigation, the court noted that “extending copyright protection is a two-edged sword from the standpoint of inducing creativity, as it would reduce the incentive of subsequent authors to create derivative works (such as new versions of popular fictional characters like Holmes and Watson) by shrinking the public domain.”

August 4, 2014

Indiana Patent Litigation: Tippmann Family Dispute Regarding Patent Ownership and Validity Escalates to Litigation

By Overhauser Law Offices, LLC

Fort Wayne, Indiana – Indiana patent attorneys for Vincent P. Tippmann, Sr. Family, LLC and Tippmann Refrigeration, Inc., both of Fort Wayne, Indiana, filed an intellectual property lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana against Gerald Tippmann of Fort Wayne, Indiana to correct ownership of Patent No. 8,220,287, “Apparatus and Method for Blast Freezing or Thawing A Product,” which was issued by the U.S. Patent Office. In addition to listing requests regarding inventorship, this Indiana patent lawsuit asks the court to, in the alternative, grant a judgment under Indiana State law of negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud on the part of Defendant, Gerald Tippmann, and for associated relief and damages.

Vincent P. Tippmann Sr. Family, LLC (“Tippmann Family, LLC”) claims ownership of the patent-in-suit, a technology that facilitates rapid and efficient freezing and thawing of food products. It also indicates that it is the inventing and owning company of various patents and patent applications related to apparatuses and methods for blast freezing and/or thawing of products.

Rapid freezing was historically done in blast freezers, which are expensive and result in irregular freezing rates across arranged product stacks. Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. (presumably an employee of Tippmann Family, LLC) were the first to recognize, and jointly design, test and reduce to practice a new method and system for freezing and thawing boxes or pallets of a commodity more efficiently and rapidly through the strategic arrangement of product boxes and pallets to create a directional airflow.

This Indiana patent litigation concerns that invention, U.S. Patent No. 8,220,287 (the “‘287 Patent”), for which Tippmann Family, LLC is the assignee. According to Plaintiffs, the inventor declaration for the patent-in-suit that was signed by Gerald Tippmann averred that he and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. were co-inventors and that the invention “was not in public use or on sale in the United States of America more than one year prior to filing this application.”

In May 2012, Gerald Tippmann left the employ of Tippmann Refrigeration, and became associated with Tippmann Construction, LLC (“Tippmann Construction”), a competitor of Tippmann Family, LLC. The owners of the Tippmann Family, LLC and the competing Tippmann Construction are relatives.

In June 2013, Gerald Tippmann and the Indiana patent lawyer for Tippmann Construction prepared a supplemental inventor declaration and disclosure statement to “clarify” statements Gerald Tippmann had made in his previous disclosures in the Tippmann Family, LLC applications. According to Plaintiffs, this supplemental declaration directly contradicts all previous declarations made by Gerald Tippmann with regard to his joint inventorship with Vincent P. Tippmann Jr., especially including its assertions that Gerald Tippmann was the sole inventor of the patent-in-suit.

In this supplemental declaration, Gerald Tippmann also indicates that he had been “mistaken” regarding the initial public display of the invention. Specifically, he claims that he had commercialized and publically used the underlying invention while in the employ of an unrelated Florida company called Citrus World on or about 1996-97.

The complaint, filed by Indiana intellectual property counsel, lists the following causes of action:

• Declaratory Judgment of Joint Inventorship, Correction of Inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 256
• Negligent Misrepresentation under Indiana State Law
• Constructive Fraud under Indiana State Law

Plaintiffs ask that the court:

(a) Find that Gerald Tippmann and Vincent P. Tippmann Jr. are the true inventors of the ‘287 Patent;
(b) Find that Gerald Tippmann’s actions at Citrus World were an experimental use, not a public use or a commercialization, and that the invention was not ready for patenting at that time;
(c) Estop Gerald Tippmann from declaring the assertions set forth in his Declaration in the related continuation and divisional applications associated with the ‘287 Patent and any future related patents that he has assigned to the Tippmann Family, LLC;
(d) Award to Tippmann Family, LLC all costs and attorney’s fees;
(e) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed negligent misrepresentation with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages; and
(f) Alternatively to (a)-(d), find that Gerald Tippmann has committed constructive fraud with respect to the actions described above, and that the Tippmann Family, LLC be awarded costs, attorney’s fees, and damages.

Practice Tip: Public disclosure – as Gerald Tippmann has apparently claimed – is often, but not always, a bar to patentability. Indiana inventors are advised to consult with an Indiana patent lawyer to determine whether their invention(s) can be protected under U.S. patent law.