Articles Posted in Company News

Hamilton County, Indiana– The Plaintiffs, DCG Indiana, Inc. d/b/a Dillon Construction Group, filed suit against Cardinal XLIII, LLC (Delaware); Motorsport Real Estate Ventures LLC (Delaware); Studio M Architecture and Planning, LLC (Indiana); Gradex, Inc. (Indiana); and Glenmark Construction Co. Inc. (Indiana) in part, for copyright infringement of works of original authorship.

Andretti-Dillon-300x164According to the complaint, in early 2022, Andretti Global hired the Plaintiff and the Defendants to design and construct a racing facility in Fishers, IN. The parties then entered into a Design-Build Contract, which included financial terms, budgets, building plans, completion dates, etc.  The Plaintiffs also claim that the contract granted Cardinal a limited, irrevocable, and nonexclusive license to use the drawings, specifications, calculations, etc. (Instruments of Service) created by DCG, while also maintaining that DCG was the author and owner of said Instruments of Service, and would, therefore, retain all common law, statutory and other reserved rights, including copyrights.  More importantly, the claim states that the contract specified that should Cardinal not substantially perform its obligations, including payment of any past-due fees to DCG, the copyright license granted to Cardinal would automatically terminate.  (Click to read the cited part of the Design-Build Contract.)

According to the Plaintiff, on March 10, 2023, Cardinal notified DCG that it would be terminating the Design-Build Contract.  At the time the Plaintiff claims Cardinal still owed them $1,011.462.21, which, according to the terms of the Design-Build Contract, meant the copyright license granted to Cardinal should have ceased.  However, the Plaintiff alleges that Cardinal continued to use DCG’s Instruments of Service after the illegal termination of the contract and even after receiving cease-and-desist letters from Plaintiff’s counsel.


Indianapolis, Indiana – Dean Graham, founder of now-defunct Help Indiana Vets, Inc. (“HIVI”), both of Acton, Indiana, was interviewed by Indianapolis television station Fox 59 regarding recent publicity about lavish spending of Wounded Warrior Project, which Graham and HIVI had first alleged in 2010. Indianapolis intellectual property attorney Paul Overhauser, publisher of this blog, was also interviewed.


Graham, a retired veteran, founded HIVI in 2010. HIVI operated with a few thousand dollars in outside donations and over $27,000 donated by Graham and his wife from their personal savings. Of those donations, 100% was spent directly on providing assistance to veterans in need.

To help raise awareness of the needs of injured veterans, as well as to ask for charitable donations, HIVI had operated a website. That website included statements criticizing how WWP of Jacksonville, Florida was run, including that WWP was “a fraud,” that it “needs to be investigated immediately” and that it “ha[s] an army of lawyers on staff to punish all those who try to expose [it].”

In response to these statements and others, WWP in November 2013 engaged lawyers from two law firms, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, one of the largest law firms in the United States, and Kutak Rock LLP,  a 500-plus attorney firm, to jointly sue HIVI and Graham on WWP’s behalf. The complaint asserted, inter alia, defamation and false advertising under the Lanham Act.

Attorney Overhauser, whose practice of law focuses on intellectual property litigation, volunteered to provide some assistance to Graham and HIVI in defending against WWP’s allegations. Nonetheless, by June 2014, concerned for the effects that the lawsuit was having on his family, Graham acceded to WWP’s demands. He shuttered his charity and its website.

Recent Attention in the Media

Following a story first broken in January by the New York Times, titled “Wounded Warrior Project Spends Lavishly on Itself, Insiders Say,” the national media have recently covered WWP extensively. Much of the attention has been focused on WWP’s “aggressive styles of fund-raising, marketing and personnel management” as well as the millions of dollars in “lavish spending on luxury travel, fancy meals and swanky getaways that rivals the amount spent on its combat stress-recovery program.” According to Fox 59, research revealed that about 40 cents of each dollar donated went to lavish spending. After an independent review of the organization’s finances, WWP dismissed its Chief Executive Officer, Steve Nardizzi, and its Chief Operating Officer, Al Giordano.

In addition to the New York Times, the allegations against Wounded Warrior Project have been covered by many national media outlets, including:

• ABC: Wounded Warrior Project Like a ‘Frat Party,’ Former Employee Says
• CBS: Wounded Warrior Project accused of wasting donation money
• Fox News: Wounded Warrior Project’s top execs fired amid lavish spending scandal
• NBC: Wounded Warrior Project’ CEO, COO Fired Amid Lavish Spending Scandal
• New York Post: Wounded Warrior Project probed for lavish spending while vets suffer

• UPI (United Press International): Wounded Warrior Project founder, top executive fired after damning CBS report

This story was also covered on a local Indiana channel, Fox 59, in an interview featuring both Graham and Overhauser. “We knew about activities [like] large parties and expenses. It was even bigger than I imagined,” said Graham. “I hope that this really does clean up from top to bottom and [cause] some changes that will be positive for veterans.

“Dean Graham has been trying to get this information out into the public for years but he was squashed by this lawsuit and had to discontinue his efforts,” said Overhauser. “The truth has come out.”

A video of the interviews featured on Fox 59 can be viewed here:

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Indianapolis, Indiana – Plaintiff and Indiana copyright attorney Richard Bell of McCordsville, Indiana was ordered by Judge Tanya Walton Pratt of the Southern District of Indiana to pay almost $34,000 in attorney’s fees and costs to Defendant Charles Lantz, whom Bell had sued on unsupported allegations of copyright infringement.

Indiana copyright attorney Richard Bell, who is also a professional photographer, has sued hundreds for copyright infringement. The lawsuits began in 2011. At issue in Bell’s spate of litigation were allegations of unauthorized use of his copyrighted photograph of the Indianapolis skyline, which had been registered at the U.S. Copyright Office. The ongoing saga of this multiplicity of copyright lawsuits took an interesting, if unsurprising, turn last week.

According to an article in The Indiana Lawyer, Bell has said that most Defendants whom he has sued have settled early. Acknowledging the expense of litigation – and the relative ease of escaping litigation by simply paying a settlement without any finding of liability – Bell said, “A responsible lawyer and their clients, they obviously know it’s going to be far more expensive to try it.”

A current copyright-infringement lawsuit, filed January 8, 2013 by Bell, named forty-seven Defendants. Forty-six of those Defendants were dismissed from the lawsuit, including some who settled and some against whom a default judgment was issued. Default judgments of $2,500 were awarded in this litigation.

One Defendant, Charles Lantz, refused to pay for copyright infringement that he had not committed and hired Indiana intellectual property attorney Paul Overhauser (publisher of this blog) to defend him. In December 2014, Lantz’s perseverance paid off and the court granted an unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal of the litigation against Lantz. Last week, Lantz’s perseverance paid off again when Overhauser, on behalf of Lantz, sought and was awarded $33,974.65 in attorney’s fees and costs from Plaintiff Bell.

The court explained that, because Bell’s copyright litigation against Lantz had been dismissed with prejudice, Lantz became the “prevailing party” under the Copyright Act. Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, in any civil copyright action, the district court may award litigation costs, including attorney’s fees, to the prevailing party.

In evaluating whether to exercise its discretion to award such costs to Lantz, the court stated, “Defendants who defeat a copyright infringement action are entitled to a strong presumption in favor of a grant of fees.” The court looked to the Fogerty factors, which are so named after Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994), a U.S. Supreme Court case involving the shifting of costs in copyright litigation. These factors are nonexclusive and include: “(1) the frivolousness of the action; (2) the losing party’s motivation for filing or contesting the action; (3) the objective unreasonableness of the action; and (4) the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”

The court found that each of these factors weighed against Bell. It stated that Bell had possessed no evidence against Lantz that would prove either a conversion or a copyright claim. It also characterized Bell’s motivation for filing the lawsuit as “questionable,” noting that Bell had attempted to save himself “extensive filing fees” by improperly joining defendants and had “sued forty-seven defendants and then quickly offered settlements to defendants who were unwilling to pay for a legal defense.”

Regarding the third and fourth factors, the court held that the litigation was objectively unreasonable, given that Lantz had been sued “without any evidence to support the claims.” The court then turned to the last of the Fogerty factors, the need to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. It noted that Bell had leveraged his status as a practicing attorney “to file meritless suits and to attempt to outmaneuver the legal system” (which was perhaps a hat tip to the now-famous opinion written by Judge Otis D. Wright III, who employed similar language against another copyright plaintiff widely regarded as a copyright troll).

Finally, the court was not swayed by Bell’s assertions that Lantz had failed to inform Bell that the wrong defendant had been sued and that Lantz had incurred unnecessary attorney’s fees. In response to these claims, the court noted that Lantz had “denied liability at his first opportunity.” The court also opined that, while defense counsel is not required to take the most economical defense strategy in defending a copyright lawsuit, it appeared that the “most economical approach feasible” may have been taken.

With all Fogerty factors weighing against Bell and no viable opposition permitting either an escape from fees and costs or a lessening of the amount, the court awarded to Defendant Lantz $33,974.65, the full amount requested.

Practice Tip: The Indiana Lawyer wrote an interesting piece regarding Judge Pratt’s order. That article may be viewed here.

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Indianapolis, Indiana – In the matter of American Petroleum Institute v. Bullseye Automotive Products, et al., Indiana trademark litigators Paul B. Overhauser and John M. Bradshaw of Overhauser Law Offices, attorneys for Carlos Silva, petitioned the court to dismiss Silva for lack of personal jurisdiction. District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt granted the motion to dismiss.

In July 2013, Indiana trademark attorneys for American Petroleum Institute (“API”) of Washington, D.C. sued in the Southern District of Indiana alleging that Bullseye Automotive Products Inc. and Bullseye Lubricants Inc., both of Chicago, Illinois (collectively, “Bullseye”), and Carlos Silva of Chicago Ridge, Illinois infringed registered API “Starburst” and “Donut” trademarks, Registration Nos. 1864428, 1868779, and 1872999.

The Bullseye entities are Illinois corporations that bottle and sell motor oil. Defendant Silva is the sole incorporator and shareholder of the Bullseye entities. Plaintiff API is a trade association for the petroleum and natural-gas industry.

API brought various claims against Bullseye and Silva as an individual, including trademark infringement and trademark dilution. It claimed that Bullseye’s labeling infringed on its “Starburst” and “Donut” certification marks. While Bullseye did not contest jurisdiction in Indiana, trademark lawyers for Silva asked the court to dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction.

API countered that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Silva in Indiana was proper, contending that Silva personally directed the allegedly infringing activities, that he exercised complete control over Bullseye and that he and Bullseye were essentially the same entity for jurisdictional purposes. API made no argument that Silva personally had sufficient contacts with Indiana to permit an Indiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

The court rejected API’s “alter-ego” theory of personal jurisdiction, stating that this argument pertained to liability, not jurisdiction. Even if the court determined that Silva were the alter ego of Bullseye, a finding that the court explicitly declined to make, such potential for liability for corporate acts was held to be irrelevant to the question of personal jurisdiction. In so ruling, the court stated that it was refusing to disregard the corporate form and bypass the protections it offers, citing the longstanding rule that a “corporation exists separately from its shareholders, officers, directors and related corporations….”

The court then analyzed whether it would be appropriate to exercise personal jurisdiction over Silva based on his personal contacts with the state of Indiana. It concluded that Silva as an individual had not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Indiana such that he would reasonably anticipate being haled into an Indiana court. Finding that the minimum contacts necessary had not been established, the court held that exercising personal jurisdiction over Silva would offend due process and the “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” and dismissed Silva from the lawsuit.

Practice Tip: Many of the arguments API made – for example, that Silva personally selected the text and design for Bullseye’s labels, that he personally negotiated with suppliers and that he oversaw production – do not support an “alter ego” theory. Activities such as these must necessarily be carried out by the sole shareholder of a small corporation. To find that a small corporation is the alter ego of a sole shareholder merely because that shareholder acts on behalf of the company would violate the basic principles of corporation law.

Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices, also recently prevailed on the issue of personal jurisdiction in the Seventh Circuit in another lawsuit alleging trademark infringement.

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Chicago, Illinois – Indiana trademark attorney Paul B. Overhauser, on behalf of K.T. Tran andRAP4Photo.JPG Real Action Paintball, Inc., a California corporation (collectively “RAP4”), argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the trademark infringement suit brought in the Northern District of Indiana by Advanced Tactical Ordnance Systems, LLC, an Indiana corporation (“ATO”), was not properly before the Indiana court, as it lacked personal jurisdiction over RAP4. The Seventh Circuit agreed and instructed the district court to dismiss the complaint.

RAP4 and ATO are competitors in the “irritant projectile” market. Unlike the more familiar game of paintball, in which a paint-filled sphere is shot at opponents as part of a war game, these irritant projectiles are used by the police and military to intervene in hostile situations where lethal force is unnecessary. While paintballs are filled with paint, irritant projectiles use capsaicin, the active ingredient in pepper spray. Irritant projectiles, thus, allow law enforcement personnel to use less-than-lethal force from a distance.

Among the many issues in this lawsuit, including assertions by ATO of trade-dress infringement, unfair competition and misappropriation of trade secrets, were allegations that RAP4 had infringed the trademarked term “PEPPERBALL,” to which ATO claimed ownership. That trademark, Registration No. 2716025, was issued in 1999 by the U.S. Trademark Office to a non-party to this suit.

The trouble began when another company, non-party PepperBall Technologies, Inc. (“PTI”), began to have financial problems. PTI had also been a competitor in the irritant-projectile market. To address its difficulties, PTI held a foreclosure sale, the validity of which was hotly contested. ATO claimed that it had purchased PTI’s trademarks – including “PEPPERBALL” – and other property during this foreclosure sale.

During the time that PTI ceased its operations and was attempting to convey its assets, RAP4 was contacted by an executive of non-party APON, a company which had manufactured some of PTI’s irritant projectiles. He asked if RAP4 was interested in acquiring irritant projectiles from APON.

RAP4 agreed to purchase irritant projectiles from APON. After having negotiated this access to APON’s machinery, recipes, and materials – which had had at one time been used by PepperBall Technologies Inc. – RAP4 announced this fact to the people on its e-mail list. Specifically, it stated in its e-mail that it had acquired access to, “machinery, recipes, and materials once used by PepperBall Technologies Inc.” It was this language to which ATO, which claimed to be the successor in interest to PTI, particularly objected.

ATO sent a cease-and-desist letter to RAP4. In response, RAP4 added a disclaimer that it was not affiliated with PTI. ATO then sued in the Northern District of Indiana. It claimed several different theories of recovery, including intentional violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1111 et seq., common law trademark infringement and unfair competition, trade dress infringement, and misappropriation of trade secrets.

Of particular interest to the Seventh Circuit in addressing this Indiana trademark litigation was the issue of personal jurisdiction over RAP4 in the Northern District of Indiana. RAP4 contested that such jurisdiction over it was lacking. ATO countered that RAP4 had sufficient contacts, including a “blast e-mail” announcement from RAP4 that would suffice for jurisdiction in Indiana, stating that “many [RAP4 customers] are located here in the state of Illinois. I mean, state of Indiana.” It also contended that RAP4 regularly e-mailed customers or potential customers from all over the United States, including Indiana, and that RAP4 had made at least one sale to an Indiana resident.

ATO conceded that it lacked general jurisdiction. Thus, the Seventh Circuit turned to an analysis of specific jurisdiction. “For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State,” noted the appellate court. Moreover, the relation between the defendant and the forum “must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum.”

In determining that personal jurisdiction existed, the Indiana district court had relied on several facts: “first, [RAP4] fulfilled several orders of the allegedly infringing projectiles for purchasers in Indiana; second, it knew that Advanced Tactical was an Indiana company and could foresee that the misleading emails and sales would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana; third, it sent at least two misleading email blasts to a list that included Indiana residents; fourth, it had an interactive website available to residents of Indiana; and finally, it put customers on its email list when they made a purchase, thereby giving the company some economic advantage.”

The Seventh Circuit held that these facts were insufficient to support specific jurisdiction. The only Indiana sales that would have been relevant were those that related to RAP4’s allegedly unlawful activity. ATO failed to meet its burden of proof of any such Indiana sales. Similarly, the court held that any effects that were purportedly felt in Indiana by ATO did not support specific jurisdiction. Instead, the relation between RAP4 and the Indiana forum “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State.”

Further, neither RAP4’s e-mail communications nor its website were held to create specific jurisdiction. If such contacts were sufficient, the court held, there would be no limiting principle on personal jurisdiction and a plaintiff could sue almost any defendant with an Internet presence or which utilized e-mail in almost any forum in the United States or the world. To find jurisdiction on such vanishingly small contacts would offend the long-held and traditional “notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

The Seventh Circuit remanded the case to the Indiana district court with instructions to vacate the judgment and dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Practice Tip #1: RAP4’s references to “Pepperball Technologies, Inc.” could not as a matter of law constitute trademark infringement, counterfeiting or false advertising. Instead, RAP4’s use of its competitor’s name is a merely a wholly permissible nominative use of that mark. As a matter of law, a “nominative use of a mark – where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service – lies outside the strictures of trademark law.”

Practice Tip #2: Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of federal court jurisdiction, without which the court is powerless to adjudicate the matter before it. However, a defendant’s argument that personal jurisdiction does not exist can easily be waived inadvertently by the incautious litigant. In this case, an evidentiary hearing regarding personal jurisdiction was conducted in December 2012. It was only by careful preservation of this argument by trademark counsel for RAP4 while litigating in the district court that the appellate court was able to hear RAP4’s claim and reverse the district court.

Practice Tip #3: This case was successfully argued before the Seventh Circuit by Paul B. Overhauser, Managing Partner of Overhauser Law Offices.

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Indianapolis, Indiana – Alexis Hutchison (“Hutchison”) (pictured right) appealed a small alexis-hutchison.jpgclaims court (“trial court”) judgment in favor of Trilogy Health Services, LLC, d/b/a Springhurst Health Campus (“Springhurst”), on Springhurst’s claim against Hutchison and her now-deceased mother, Martha Farber (“Farber”), for payment of services provided to Farber while she was a resident at Springhurst. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.

For a number of years, Farber was ill with cancer, requiring various trips to, and stays at, hospitals. After one of her hospital visits, and finding that she was in need of constant care, she became a resident at Springhurst, a skilled nursing facility.

When Farber was admitted to Springhurst, Hutchison signed Springhurst’s Move-In Agreement (“Agreement”) as a “Responsible Party/Agent.” This Agreement stated that, to the extent that Hutchison was authorized to “control[] or access[]” her mother’s assets, she agreed to direct her mother’s income and resources towards any financial obligations which Farber had to Springhurst. Springhurst later contended that Farber and Hutchison, as Farber’s Responsible Party/Agent, owed $1,716.90 for services rendered to Farber. Farber disputed all but a small portion of the charges and Springhurst filed suit against Farber and Hutchinson.

A trial was held. During the trial, Hutchison testified that she was not Farber’s power of attorney and that she had “no authority to use [her] mother’s income for anything.” Hutchison indicated that the only thing she could have done was point out to her mother that a bill was owed. When Hutchison cross examined Dionne Fields (“Fields”), Springhurst’s business office manager, Fields admitted that Springhurst had no documents indicating that Hutchison had any authority over her mother’s financial affairs.

Hutchison also called as a witness her husband, David Hutchison (“David”), who was present when Hutchison signed the Agreement. David testified that Hutchison had asked if signing the Agreement would make her personally financially responsible for her mother’s stay at the nursing facility. The Springhurst representative, he said, had answered with “an emphatic no.”

The trial court found the evidence – including the language of the contract, the assurances of Springhurst that Hutchison would not be held personally liable and the uncontroverted testimony that Hutchison had no power of attorney over her mother – to be unpersuasive. It rendered a general judgment in favor of Springhurst stating that “the court found the plaintiff proved the defendant liable pursuant to contract and Indiana case law for the sum of $2,610.87” but declined to specify further facts or law in support of the judgment.

Hutchison, again acting as her own attorney, appealed this ruling and the Indiana Court of Appeals held in her favor. The appellate court first cited federal limitations that have been enacted regarding the notion of imposing upon one family member financial responsibility for another family member’s care. For example, under 42 U.S.C. §§1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii) and 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii), a nursing home certified as eligible for Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement “must not require a third party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission . . . to, or continued stay in, the facility.” The Indiana Administrative Code provides a similar restriction in 410 Ind. Admin. Code 16.2-3.1-16.5.

The appellate court then acknowledged that resident rights activists echoed Hutchison’s argument that an agreement to assume the status of a “responsible party,” and the personal financial liability which might accompany that, might be inconsistent with federal law and inherently illegal. The court, however, declined to decide this issue, which was apparently one of first impression in Indiana courts.

The court also declined to address the testimony that Springhurst had assured Hutchison that she would not incur personal financial liability by signing the Agreement.

Instead, the court found the provisions of the Agreement itself, in conjunction with undisputed evidence, to be dispositive. The Agreement stated that Farber “may designate” a person to act on her behalf as a Responsible Party/Agent and that, if such a designation was to be made, “the Resident shall provide the Facility with a copy of a written agreement that authorizes such individual to manage, use, control or access the Resident’s income, financial account(s) or other resources” (emphasis added by the court). It was undisputed that neither Farber nor anyone else had provided Springhurst with any such document; indeed, the unrefuted evidence had been that Springhurst did not possess any such document.

The court noted that Hutchison’s responsibilities, then, were at most “to pay the Facility the full amount of the Resident’s income and resources that the Responsible Party/Agent controls or accesses” (emphasis added by the court). As it was undisputed that Hutchison possessed neither control nor access to Farber’s income and resources, the appellate court concluded that the trial court had clearly erred. It reversed and remanded the matter with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Hutchison.

Practice Tip #1: Cases tried before the bench in small claims court are reviewed for clear error and appellate courts are particularly deferential to the trial court in small claims actions. The appellate court, when reviewing the case, will not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but will consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Moreover, when a trial court’s judgment is rendered as a “general judgment,” as was the case here, that judgment will be affirmed upon any legal theory consistent with the evidence. Thus, it is very important to put on one’s best possible case to the trial court, as substantial deference is given to the trial court’s findings.

Practice Tip #2: While this case was not an Indiana intellectual property case, we include it in the Indiana Intellectual Property Law Blog to congratulate Alexis Hutchison, a valued and talented member of the Overhauser Law Offices team, on her well-deserved success in litigating this matter.

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For over 50 years, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (“NORAD”) and itspicture-1.jpg predecessor, the Continental Air Defense Command, have tracked Santa’s flight around the world. Their high-technology approach includes not only radar and satellites in geo-synchronous orbit but also the recent additions of strategically placed SantaCams and jet pilots flying F-15s, F-16s and F-22s to escort Santa as he delivers presents to children on the “nice” list worldwide.

However, as technologically advanced as NORAD’s equipment is, it lacks the precision that some children desire. It is, after all, one thing to know that Santa is in your city. It is another thing entirely to receive notification of Santa’s arrival in your house.

As a result, even as NORAD finalizes this year’s preparations to track Santa, enterprising children have turned to some recent innovations to fill this gap. Among them is the “Santa Claus Detector,” U.S. Patent No. 5,523,741. This invention includes a pin in the toe of the Christmas stocking, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 4.


Indianapolis, IN – Blue Pillar Inc., currently headquartered in Atlanta, has announced that it is moving its headquarters to Indianapolis and plans to create 70 new jobs in the area. According to the Indianapolis Star, the jobs will have an average salary of $40/hour. Blue Pillar is a software company that develops software that helps manage energy use. The company expects to continue development of energy management software. According to the Indiana Business Journal, Blue Pillar’s clients include medical centers at several large university hospitals. The company will receive a grant from Develop Indy, an Indianapolis economic development project, to relocate.

Blue Pillar joins several other Indiana software and Internet companies that have recently announced new jobs in the industry. Slingshot SEO, the internet marketer on the Far Northside of Indianapolis, announced plans for expansion and 114 new jobs earlier this month. The Indianapolis Star reported that Slingshot SEO received $1.5 million in incentives from the Indiana Economic Development Corporation and a tax break from the City of Indianapolis. Also this month, the software development company DeveloperTownannounced its project to create an incubator for start-up technology companies

The growing software and Internet sector will increase the need for Indiana intellectual property attorneys.


New York – The New York Times reported earlier this week on Righthaven, LLC, a company that has sued hundreds of bloggers for copyright violation. The N.Y. Times story profiles one such blogger, Brian Hill, a 20 year-old North Carolina resident, who was sued by Righthaven after he used a photo of an airport security pat-down on his blog. Righthaven has filed over 250 copyright infringement lawsuits since its founding in 2010, including 24 in March 2011. According to reports, its business model is to purchase assignments of copyrights from newspapers and similar organizations and then search for infringing web postings to sue their publishers.

A Google search on Righthaven reveals that there are numerous websites devoted to condemning Righthaven, calling the company “a bottom feeding legal outfit” and “copyright trolls.” As the N.Y. Times story reported, copyright attorneys have questioned whether the fair use doctrine might protect some of the bloggers sued by Righthaven. The Media Bloggers Association has filed an amicus curiae brief support the rights of the bloggers and raising First Amendment issues. Other attorneys have accused Righthaven of fraud, according to a report from the Las Vegas Sun.

Practice Tip: Although Righthaven has not filed any copyright infringement lawsuits in Indiana district courts to date, this story illustrates the importance of ensuring that a web blogger has rights to use all materials that are posted on the blog. This story brings forth yet again the continuing controversies surrounding copyrights and the Internet.

 Indianapolis — The New York Times reported this week that the pharmaceutical industry may lose billions as a result of the patent expirations in 2011. The article notes that many pharmaceutical companies may not have enough new drugs in research in development to replace the income lost due to these expirations. The Indiana’s Eli Lilly is mentioned, specifically noting that Lilly’s setback the development of an Alzheimer’s drug.

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